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The article analyzes the situation in Libya with a special focus on the relations between post-Qadhafi 
Libya and Europe, and discusses the recent challenges for progress in Libya and the perspectives for 
EU-Libyan cooperation in the coming years. Also the article characterizes the situation in Libya two 
years after the start of the revolt against Qadhafi, the recent development within Libyan society and 
the conditions for Libya for becoming a normal foreign policy and security actor on the 
Mediterranean political scene. In connection with this two aspects appear as particularly relevant, the 
first aspect being the migration issue, where Libya over the last decades have emerged as a very 
important transit migration country for people from south of Sahara trying to reach Europe. The 
second aspect has to do with different types of internal contradictions in Libya along tribal, ethnic-
religious and regional lines and the reality of a “dual power” situation in recent Libya. On one side 
the weak state led by the General National Congress and the Libyan Army, on the other side the 
unofficial leadership in the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) and affiliated armed councils. 
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Introduction 
A parliament is a misrepresentation of the people  
and parliamentary governments are a misleading  
solution to the problem of democracy 
(Muammar Qadhafi: The Green Book, Part One: 
The Solution of the Problem of Democracy) 
 
Philosophical thoughts by the late Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi like those quoted above 
functioned as an ideological cover up for one of the most repressive states the world has seen. In 
reality the “popular congresses and peoples committee’s”1 were dominated and overruled by the 
small elite around the dictator himself. At the same time the ideas constituted attempts at 
legitimizing a state, which in some ways differed from the enormous bureaucracies we have 
seen elsewhere in the MENA-region. The Libyan state apparatus was indeed inefficient, corrupt 
and repressive, but it was relatively undeveloped – partly due to the wishes of the late leader. 
Ironically this might turn out to be an asset for the new nation in the sense that a coming 
democratic Libyan state in some areas start from scratch, and – in a positive scenario – can 
establish modern political practices and administrative procedures only partly being affected by 
problematic habits of the former regime and its bureaucracy. 
In 2010 “Mineral fuels and related products” accounted for 97,1 percent of the Libyan 
export.2 Obviously it is extremely important for the Libyan recovery that the oil and gas 
production and export soon reach the level before the war, and according to informal business 
sources restoration of Libyan oil production is progressing reasonably fast. But also of 
significance is it to begin dealing with other leftovers from the former Qadhafi’s Libya, namely 
a high unemployment as a result of the small and inefficient production sector. Foreign 
investments can over the coming years contribute to solving this problem and if successful this 
dimension of a new Libya can also help getting rid of a potentially destabilizing element in 
post-Qadhafi Libya, namely large numbers of armed non-state groups (see Internal 
Contradictions”). 
According to a European Commission Memo a rapprochement between the new Libya 
and the EU is underway. The EU Election Assessment Team covered the parliamentary 
elections concluding “that the electoral process had been efficiently administered and pluralistic 
and was overall conducted in a peaceful manner”.3 Since the fall of Qadhafi the EU has 
supported the Libyan authorities with funding for projects working on public administration, 
democratic transition, civil society, health and education. Furthermore projects dealing with 
                                                          
1 QADHAFI, M. A. 1975. The Green Book. Part One. The Solution of the Problem of Democracy. 'The 
Authority of the People', Tripoli, the Public Establishment for Publishing., p. 26. The titles of the three 
small volumes together constituting The Green Book are The Solution of the Problem of Democracy, The 
Solution of the Economic Problem and The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory, respectively. For 
an excellent analysis of Gadaffis work, see VANDEVALLE, D. 2006. A History of Modern Libya, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p. 97-138. 
2 Calculated on the basis of figures from 2012. The Middle East and North Africa 2013, London, 
Routledge. The amounts (in Libyan Dinars) in 2010 were 44.485,1 out of 46.196,3. Added to that 
“chemicals and related products” represented almost 75 percent of the remaining export. 
3 The Memo was published on the European Commission homepage 8 February 2013: EU-
COMMISSION 2013. EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of Play after Two Years. Brussels: 
European Commission. 
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security, technical and vocational education and training, economic development, migration and 
civil society activities have been launched by the EU. The EU is discussing Libya’s possible full 
participation in cooperation agreements in a Mediterranean perspective, of which the Union for 
the Mediterranean (UfM) is one. 
It is the aim of this article to analyze the situation in Libya with a special focus on the 
relations between post-Qadhafi Libya and Europe, and discuss the recent challenges for 
progress in Libya and the perspectives for EU-Libyan cooperation in the coming years. The 
article will characterize the situation in Libya two years after the start of the revolt against 
Qadhafi, the recent development within Libyan society and the conditions for Libya for 
becoming a normal foreign policy and security actor on the Mediterranean political scene. In 
connection with this two aspects appear as particularly relevant, the first aspect being the 
migration issue, where Libya over the last decades have emerged as a very important transit 
migration country for people from south of Sahara trying to reach Europe. The second aspect 
has to do with different types of internal contradictions in Libya along tribal, ethnic-religious 
and regional lines and the reality of a “dual power” situation in recent Libya. On one side the 
weak state led by the General National Congress and the Libyan Army, on the other side the 
unofficial leadership in the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) and affiliated armed councils. 
The latter might be the strongest part, as described by Ibrahim Sharqieh.4 
 
“The stateless society” and the legacy of Qadhafi 
According to Dirk Vandewalle the relatively undeveloped public sector in Libya was a reality 
already before the coup against King Idriss in September 1969.5 The king had never seriously 
worked on establishing a transition process, which led to a more modern society; rather he had 
led the foundation of a passive rentier-state structure, where the oil revenues were spent on 
privileges for the royal leaders and the elite around them. Only few observers in the region were 
according to Vandewalle surprised, when the actual take-over took place,6 although it had been 
anticipated that a number of senior officers would be the ones to carry out the coup, when it 
finally happened.  
The young officers who were in charge of the takeover, were inspired by the Egyptian 
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser regarding Arab nationalism. Qadhafi was chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, which in the start was making the decisions about what to do 
with the potentially rich Libyan state, which still hadn’t reached a level of production, where a 
definite rentier-economy had developed. The question might be if this ever really happened, 
because rather than developing a Gulf-style rentier-mentality in the Libyan population by 
buying them off, the new leader in Libya established a unique type of regime, where a 
combination of rentier-economy, an ideological superstructure and harsh repression functioned 
as the foundation for the state. 
Qadhafi wrote the Green Book with the purpose of building a state based on his ideas and 
the system described in the three volumes was implemented over the first decades of rule and 
                                                          
4 SHARQIEH, I. 2013. The Libyan Revolution at Two. In: LYNCH, M. E. A. (ed.) Foreign Policy 
Middle East Channel. Washington: Foreign Policy Middle East Channel. 
5 VANDEVALLE, D. 2006. A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p. 78. 
6 For an excellent description of the development in Libya with a focus on the period from the Italian 
occupation to the last years of Qadhafi’s reign, see ibid. See also WRIGHT, J. 2012. A History of Libya, 
London, Hurst & Company. and ST JOHN, R. B. 2011. Libya. Continuity and Change, London and New 
York, Routledge. 
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developed through a permanent revolutionary process, according to Vandewalle with disastrous 
effects. Furthermore the “pursuit and implementation of statelessness could not disguise that the 
Popular Congress and Committee system, as well as the General People’s Congress, possessed 
no real power.”7 As mentioned the relatively small bureaucracy might – despite all its 
deficiencies – leave the Libyans a chance of building something more reliable from the start. 
Another significant aspect of the Qadhafi legacy is that only extremely few, if any, would wish 
to go back to a rule like his. Right after 1969 some populist legitimacy might have been 
attached to the regime, which replaced the unpopular King Idriss, but only for a few years. In 
other words there is no strong restorative movement in Libya, fighting to bring back what was 
before 2011. The mentioned contradictions between the weak state in post-Qadhafi Libya and 
the stronger leadership in the form the SSC, might partly be explained by the relatively 
undeveloped state apparatus and – of course – the existence of power structures related to the 
militarized movement, which during 2011 fought against the Libyan army and its mercenaries. 
      
Libya and the EU – security perspectives 
When NATO 25 October 2011 issued its Operational Media Update, stating that “the 
operations were very close to completion”8 they left a Libya behind, which was no longer 
threatened by Qadhafi and his army. Five days earlier the dictator had been killed while 
attempting to flee the “rebels” and with his death forty-two years of military rule was over. The 
military action starting in March 2011 was launched based on an UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973, with the explicit aim to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.9 The situation in Benghazi was 
critical and there is hardly any doubt that the NATO action prevented an attack by the Libyan 
army on Benghazi, which could have developed into a massacre on the anti-Qadhafi rebels and 
maybe, in “retaliation” on the inhabitants of the large East-Libyan city. 
The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé presented the UN Security Council Resolution 
1973 in the UN Headquarters in New York referring to the potentially tragic situation on the 
ground in Libya, but also included considerations of a different scope by mentioning that the 
world was experiencing “a wave of great revolutions that would change the course of history”.10 
Security concerns were an important issue in relation to the dramatic development in Libya. On 
one side Europe (and the West) did not want a civil war to unfold south of the Mediterranean, 
which could destabilize the region. On the other side a NATO-action like what was proposed 
might also in a longer perspective lead to a situation, where a different (and ideally stable and 
democratic) regime could be the outcome.11 As such the intervention in Libya through the 
                                                          
7 VANDEVALLE, D. 2006. A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p. 
136. 
8 NATO 2011. Operational Media Update: NATO and Libya, 25 October. In: ALLIED JOINT FORCE 
COMMAND NAPLES, S., NATO HQ (ed.). Naples: NATO. 
9 SECURITY COUNCIL. 2011. UN Press Release: Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over 
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 
Abstentions. New York: United Nations Security Council. 
10 Ibid. 
11 VESELY, M. 2011. Why is the West bombing Libya? The Middle East, May 2011, 20-21. 
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establishment of the no-fly zone can also be interpreted as an attempt once and for all to get rid 
of an unpredictable and unreliable authoritarian leader in Libya. 
In recent years the pragmatic EU foreign policy of working together with the 
authoritarian regimes in the MENA-region included Libya, which had entered a more moderate 
course following the final compromise on the Lockerbie-affair.12  The general softening of 
Libyan foreign relations signals was an attempt to gain access to foreign expertise for the 
purpose of maintaining and developing the oil infrastructure and to attract foreign investments. 
The EU leaders claimed from time to time to have confronted Qadhafi with his poor record 
concerning Human Rights, as for instance when the French President Nicolas Sarkozy claimed 
that he had brought up the issue in connection with Qadhafi’s visit in Paris in 2007. According 
to Ronald Bruce St John Qadhafi later denied that the issue at all had been mentioned at his 
meeting with Sarkozy.13  
Added to that Qadhafi had common interests with the EU in the establishment of a 
security environment in the Mediterranean, preventing terrorist groups from gaining foothold in 
the region and dealing with the threat attached to the relation between migration and security. 
For the EU it was also a question of energy security. The attractive Libyan oil form a part of the 
European energy supply and stable delivery is of course essential. When the EU launched the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, Libya did not become a member. The same was the 
case in 2004, when the European Neighbourhood Programme was established – again despite 
the lifting of the UN sanctions against Libya in 1999. According to George Joffé Libya was 
never interested in becoming a member.14 What in the first place was important for the EU was 
to make Libya a part of the external setup securing the southern European borders from illegal 
migration from the North African states, and human smuggling, trafficking etc. using the 
Maghreb-states and Libya as transit countries for irregular and illegal migration from Africa 
south of Sahara.  
An important issue for the EU was to secure itself from the strategic threat attached to 
Libyan possession of WMDs, which Libya renunciated in December 2003. More than anything 
else this was what secured the gradual normalization of Libya as an accepted state at the 
international policical scene.15 In 2009 the EU published the so-called Country Strategy Paper 
and National Indicative Programme 2011-201316, which establishes a framework for relations 
between the EU and Libya. The document claims that the most important aim is “to consolidate 
Libya’s integration in the rulesbased international political and economic system.”17 The 
                                                          
12 For a description of the negotiations leading to the agreement on Lockerbie, see CHORIN, E. 2012. 
Exit Gaddafi. The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution, London, Saqi., p. 66-69. 
13 ST JOHN, R. B. 2008. Libya and the United States: A Faustian Pact? Middle East Policy, 15, 133-148., 
p. 145. 
14 JOFFÉ, G. 2011. Libya and the European Union: shared interests. The Journal of North African 
Studies, 16, 233-249., p. 234. 
15 For a description of this process and its perspectives see BRAUT-HEGGHAMMER, M. 2008. Libya's 
Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli. Middle East Journal, 62, 55-72. See also ST JOHN, R. 
B. 2008. Libya and the United States: A Faustian Pact? Middle East Policy, 15, 133-148. 
16 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Libya. Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme 2011-2013. In: EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Brussels. 
17 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Strategy Paper mentions a wide range of activities, which for most of the measures were 
planned for the 2011-2013 period, but because of the revolt against Qadhafi starting in Benghazi 
in February 2011 many of the activities were never launched or carried out. The intended areas 
of cooperation are not described in detail and appear to be relevant also for a post-Qadhafi 
situation. 
As mentioned in the European Commission Memo of 8 February 2013 “Almost from the 
very first days of the Arab Spring, EU leaders, including the President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the 
Commission (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton made frequent visits to the region to express the EU's 
political commitment.”18 In May 2011 Catherine Ashton visited Benghazi and officially opened 
an EU office and after the fall of the regime, in November 2011, she opened the EU Delegation 
office in Tripoli. As emphasized by Marlene Gottwald one of the first ambitions was to secure, 
that European nationals in Libya were safe and that the delivery of EU humanitarian aid 
functioned well. Immediately after the victory for the anti-Qadhafi-forces the EU started to 
focus on development cooperation. At first, funding was provided for building of administrative 
capacities and for civil society and education programmes.19 At the Paris conference on Libya in 
September 2011, the EU was assigned the assessment of border management, civil society and 
media.  
Furthermore the EU became involved in security sector reform. In March the EU send a 
mission to Libya aiming at dealing with border management. EU funded some of the activities 
they initiated, but it should also be mentioned, that one of the ways of providing Libya with 
financial means for reconstruction and development purposes was by “unfreezing” of Libyan 
assets in foreign banks. As described by Barah Mikail it was decided at the Paris conference, 
prior to Qadhafis death, to unfreeze $15 billion. Added to that the EU decided to unfreeze 
additional assets worth $97 billion belonging to the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Arab 
Foreign Bank. It was estimated that up to $ 160 billion were held by foreign partners by the fall 
of the regime in Tripoli.20 Obviously, this sum is large enough to finance a considerable amount 
of reconstruction and developmental projects for the new Libyan government. 
The EU is, as stated at the EEAS homepage covering Libya, “currently running a €30 
million programme in Libya to address some of the most pressing needs. Activity includes 
support in the fields of Reconciliation, elections and respect for human rights, Public 
administrative capacity, Media and civil society and promoting the involvement of women in 
public life, Migration, Health and education.”21 At the time of writing (March 2013) it is still 
too early to say to which degree the programme will succeed in creating significant progress 
within the mentioned areas. The fact that the activities take place represent ambitions of 
                                                          
18 EU-COMMISSION 2013. EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of Play after Two Years. 
Brussels: European Commission., p. 2. 
19 GOTTWALD, M. 2012. TEPSA BRIEF. Options for EU engagement in post-conflict Libya. Brussels: 
Trans European Policy Studies Association. 
20 MIKAIL, B. 2012. The multiple challenges of Libya's reconstruction. Fride Policy Brief, No. 114, 
January 2012., p. 2. 
21 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/libya/index_en.htm.  
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establishing a kind of normality in Libya, which, all things being equal, maybe are the most 
important aspect of the cooperation activities. 
A number of activities are described at homepages established with the purpose of 
information about the recent running programmes as referred to by the EU Neighbourhood Info 
Centre with a special focus on civil society. Furthermore the pages mention the different 
programmes dealing with EU assistance packages for education, administration and civil 
society, support for “security, technical and vocational education and training, economic 
development, migration and further support to civil society”22. As an explicit expression of a 
further normalization of post-Qadhafi Libya can be mentioned, as stated in the European 
Commission Memo of 8 February 2013, that Libya has announced its ambition of joining the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as observer.23  
The EU has several important foreign and security policy interests concerning Libya to 
attend to, in connection with which the new regime will play a significant role. First of all the 
turmoil following the war against the old regime has to calm down, and as a part of that the 
militias from the fighting in 2011 will have to be disarmed as much as this is possible in a 
country where the security and control apparatus is still at a relatively low level. Some of the 
agreements related to oil and gas production, export and trade will have to be renegotiated at the 
same time as renewed search for oil wells and repair of production facilities must be taken care 
of. Furthermore cooperation between Libya and the EU authorities should be dealt with; a work 
which has started but still, as shown, has a long way to go. Libya has not been an integrated 
partner for the EU in any of the cooperation constructions, which other MENA-states have been 
part of. Finally the EU and Libya will have to take care of the complex and important migration 
phenomenon with its wide range of security implications. 
 
Migration and security 
Libya has, as a large oil producing country, hosted a significant amount of migrant workers 
from the two neighbouring countries, Egypt and Tunisia, but also from African countries from 
south of Sahara. Since the entry into force of joint naval patrols with Italy in May 2009, the 
number of illegal migrants arriving in Italy and Malta from Libya has fallen very sharply.24 
When the fighting started in early 2011, an enormous exodus was initiated, sending back work 
migrants and refugees to Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, Sudan, Algeria etc. Added to that there have 
been minor flows across the Mediterranean, mainly to Italy and Malta. As described by Dina 
Abdelfattah the immediate effect of the situation in 2011 was a significant migration crisis 
                                                          
22 See http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/features/Lybia%20-
Showing%20a%20new%20face%20to%20the%20world%20-%20EN.pdf. See also http://www.enpi-
info.eu/mainmed.php?id=344&id_type=3&lang_id=450. Concerning the economic aspects of Libyan-EU 
cooperation, see this link: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/libya/  
23 EU-COMMISSION 2013. EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of Play after Two Years. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
24 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Libya. Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme 2011-2013. In: EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Brussels, p. 7. 
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which was “considered the largest since the first Gulf War in 1990.”25 According to IOM 
sources up to one million migrants had left Libya by November 2011.  
UNHCR and IOM organized repatriation programmes and with the continued oil and gas 
production the situation is gradually returning to its former status. Sub-Saharan African 
migrants constitute the largest group of stranded migrants in Libya and they are at the same time 
the most vulnerable group, which always have been exposed to harsh Libyan migration policies. 
Libya has had a status as a “migration corridor”, as stated by Sylvie Bredeloup & Olivier Pliez 
and this might also be the case for post-Qadhafi Libya.26   
“The eruption of the conflict in Libya as of mid-February provoked the displacement of 
around 800.000 persons of many different nationalities towards the neighbouring countries, in 
particular Tunisia and Egypt”, as mentioned in an EU-Commission report.27  The situation was 
critical, not the least for the Arab workers, who stayed in Libya, because due to the recent 
conditions in their home countries, they had severe social problems after their return. The 
financial crisis from 2008 resulted in declining opportunities in the low and middle income 
MENA-states, so the oil-producing states (including Libya) became a remaining destination for 
migrant workers. Added to that, and maybe even more important, the postrevolutionary 
slowdown in Tunisia and Egypt created very difficult circumstances for the returning workers. 
As Abdelfattah sums up most of the “workers escaping the unrest lost their jobs and income, 
and often had to leave behind their assets and often some of their savings. Some never received 
their last wages and others saw their money and valuables taken by the Libyan forces.”28  
The conflict in Libya in 2011 started with the demonstrations in Benghazi in the 
beginning of February. At that time the country was home to between 1,5 and 2,5 mio. foreign 
nationals, many of them refugees, although they were treated as irregular migrants by the 
Libyan authorities.  The registered refugees came from countries including Côte d’Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. The war led to hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced Libyans and created, together with the refugees and foreign work migrants from 
Egypt, Tunisia etc. who left Libya, a complex and chaotic situation for the large migrant 
population in Libya. Qadhafi used migration as a political tool putting pressure on Europe. 
Obviously his fall has not resulted in stopping the floods of migrants from sub-Saharan states 
trying to reach Europe via Libya, even though the fighting in itself reduced the amount of transit 
migrants in 2011.  
                                                          
25 ABDELFATTAH, D. 2011. Impact of Arab Revolts on Migration. CARIM Analytic and Synthetic 
Notes Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
26 BREDELOUP, S. & PLIEZ, O. 2011. The Libyan Migration Corridor. Research Report, Case Study, 
EU-US Immigration Systems. Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies. See also BOB-MILLIAR, G. M. 2012. Rescuing Migrants in Libya: The Political 
Economy of State Responses to Migration Crises – The Case of Ghana. DIIS Report. Copenhagen: DIIS. 
27 A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. In: EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Brussels. 
28 ABDELFATTAH, D. 2011. Impact of Arab Revolts on Migration. CARIM Analytic and Synthetic 
Notes Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies., p. 13. 
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As mentioned by Mikail the EU could help Libya by improving its migration policies via 
control of the Mediterranean Sea in cooperation with the new Libyan government: “The ‘Arab 
Spring’ has created a deeply insecure regional situation due to the insufficiency or even lack of 
controls at the borders of countries undergoing transitions (Libya and Tunisia, and their borders 
with Egypt). Radical elements have been able to spread in the region (...) A stronger 
involvement of Libya’s international partners to help strengthen border controls would 
considerably reduce regional threats.”29  
A significant point is that the international community, having helped the Libyans 
overthrow Qadhafi, now has an important task involving itself into the further development of a 
new security environment in the Mediterranean, not the least in the interest of the EU itself. It is 
a likely outcome of the Arab revolts that they in the short term perspective will result in more 
chaotic migration tendencies. In the long run, however, the former commonality of interests 
between the EU and the authoritarian leaders in the MENA-region in handling transit migration 
from countries south of Sahara probably will be reconstructed and new agreements will be 
negotiated to the benefit of both parties north and south of the Mediterranean.  
The war in Libya from early 2011 meant the effective suspension of agreements and 
cooperation between Libya and the EU. The UNHCR in Tripoli is calling for ‘burden sharing’ 
in the Mediterranean arguing that the EU-states should accept some resettlement of refugees in 
Europe itself.30 It is a controversial issue, which already under Qadhafi was used at pressuring 
the EU. According to Abdelfattah Qadhafi exaggerated the actual threat by making the irregular 
migration towards Europe appear much bigger than the true situation, and even, following the 
NATO-attacks in 2011, he threatened that “if the Europeans continued to support the protesters, 
he will open the floodgates, and (…) send boats filled with migrants from North Africa and 
Sub-Saharan Africa to the European coasts.”31 
 
Internal contradictions 
As demonstrated, post-Qadhafi Libya is marked by challenges, which will require serious 
efforts from external actors such as the EU and the UN. Despite the multitude of challenges, 
there is hardly doubt  that one of the most critical tasks is posed by the widespread possession of 
firearms and the large number of  groups of armed persons acting beyond  legal constrains. 
While controlling parts of the country, these groups pose significant security threats both on the 
short and long term.  
It is difficult to ascertain the actual number of armed non-state groups, but some 
observers estimate that it exceeds hundred.32 On a daily basis, problems caused by the armed 
groups include the construction of random roadblocks and gunfire in the streets. Moreover, 
                                                          
29 MIKAIL, B. 2012. The multiple challenges of Libya's reconstruction. Fride Policy Brief, No. 114, 
January 2012., p. 5. 
30 BARTOLOMEO, A. D., FAKHOURY, T. & PERRIN, D. 2010. CARIM - Migration Profile. Libya. 
In: CARIM (ed.). Florence: CARIM: Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. 
31 ABDELFATTAH, D. 2011. Impact of Arab Revolts on Migration. CARIM Analytic and Synthetic 
Notes Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies., p. 14. 
32 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. 2011. Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After 
Qadhafi. Middle East/North Africa Report, 115., p. i. 
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power struggles between armed groups frequently evolve into fights in the streets, injuring and 
killing persons involved in the fights as well as innocent bystanders.33  
The armed groups are also suspected of being responsible for routine violation of human 
rights. Both because of the power struggles among the groups and because of a widespread 
vigilantism, some armed groups take captives and hold detainees without just cause. According 
to Amnesty International, there have been cases of executions based on invalid trials and many 
of the detainees have been subject to torture. The evidence reported by the organisation includes 
signs of severe violations of human rights.34 In addition to human tragedies resulting from these 
events, the impact on the rebuilding of the Libyan economy and civil society is significant. As 
the security situation remains tense, foreign investors are reluctant to engage in the country and 
efforts of establishing civilian organisations are continuously hampered.35  
The gravity of the problem, however, does seem to be recognised by the Libyan national 
government. Especially since the tragic events at the American consulate in Benghazi 
September 2012, the national authorities have appeared to give priority to the area. Until then, 
authorities appeared rather hesitant, but widespread demonstrations in the cities of Libya and 
international reactions appear to have changed the attitude somewhat.36  
International NGOs as Amnesty International and International Crisis Group are also very 
aware of the problem. They point to the dangers of the armed groups in a number of reports. 
Yet, by terming the armed groups “militias” the NGOs appear to present a slightly limited 
understanding of them.37 In effect, the armed groups are very diverse, holding different 
capabilities and objectives. While the number of armed groups multiplied under the revolution, 
they did so in response to different local conditions, and as a result, they have different ways of 
operating and self-perpetuating.38 These differences will be elaborated in the following, as it is 
vital to take them into account, when planning a response to the challenge posed by the armed 
groups.  
Even if categorisation always entails simplification, it is useful, as suggested by Brian 
McQuinn, to distinguish between four categories of non-state armed groups. By far the largest 
category of armed non-state groups is the revolutionary brigades. As the name indicates, these 
groups developed in the course of the revolution. They began as unorganised street fighting 
groups, but soon developed a remarkable force and strategic knowledge. Presumably, they now 
possess significant combat experience. Most members of the revolutionary brigades are students 
and employees in the private sector, while a smaller proportion are employees in the public 
sector, professionals or unemployed. Seemingly, they hold an identity as guardians of the 
revolution, responsible for its completion.  
As a part of the revolutionary brigades broke away from the authority of local military 
councils in the later stages of the civil war, another category of armed non-state groups 
developed. McQuinn terms this category unregulated brigades. Even though they do not 
                                                          
33 Militias Threaten Hopes for New Libya. In: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. London., p. 5. 
34 Ibid.,. 6. 
35 BARFI, B. & PACK, J. 2012. In War’s Wake. The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya. Policy Focus. 
Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy., p. 19. 
36 LIBYA HERALD 22 & 28 September, 2012. 
37 This is shown in Amnesty International, 2012: ”Militias Threaten Hopes for New Libya” and 
International Crisis Group: “Holding Libya Togheter: Security Challenges After Qadhafi” 2011:1  
38 MCQUINN, B. 2012. Armed Groups in Libya: Typology and Roles. Research Notes. Armed Actors. 
Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies., p. 2. 
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comprise a very large proportion of the armed groups, their roles in their communities make 
them significant. By breaking away from the revolutionary brigades, they earned legitimacy in 
local areas. A third category of armed non-state actors may be called post-revolutionary 
brigades. This kind of armed groups was formed, as Qadhafi forces were defeated in various 
parts of the country, leaving substantial security vacuums. Rapidly emerged, these groups are 
characterised by a significantly lesser degree of coordination, discipline and combat experience 
than the above-mentioned groups. However, the post-revolutionary groups are participating in 
armed conflicts with increasing frequency and intensity, thus gaining combat experience. Lastly, 
a small number of armed groups can be categorised as militias. They consist of violent 
extremists and conduct various criminal activities such as smuggling39.   
In principle, insight to the variations between the armed groups allows a differentiated 
approach to them and the security threats that they pose. It should be realised that the National 
Army of Libya is currently very weak as a consequence of Qadhafi’s rule. Qadhafi perceived 
the army as a potential threat and therefore deliberately kept it divided and inefficient.40 Thus, 
the army is in no position to control or defeat the different types of armed groups by force. 
Limiting the security threat posed by the armed non-state actors must, therefore, be obtained by 
alternative strategies.  
 
Enhancing legitimacy of the National Army 
In dealing with the revolutionary brigades, the most important thing to take into consideration is 
their identity as guardians of the revolution. In combination with their strong organisation, this 
identity makes it unwise to seek their total abolishment. Rather, it seems reasonable to integrate 
them in the National Army, thereby gaining control over the revolutionary brigades and 
strengthening the National Army at the same time. This approach has proven difficult, however, 
as the revolutionary brigades are highly suspicious of the National Army. A number of wartime 
leaders are still prominent within The National Army. According to McQuinn, the National 
army is, therefore, perceived as counter-revolutionary in the eyes of the revolutionary 
brigades.41  
To address this problem, a more systematic purge of the National Army would be necessary. 
The establishment of the Integrity Commission in April 2012 can be seen as an attempt to 
initiate this process.42 This Commission serves to investigate any close links that appointees to 
high office have had with the former regime and in general expose any wrongdoings committed 
by them. Nevertheless, the Commission has been heavily criticised by human rights 
organisations and the general public for using the same methods as Qadhafi’s regime, lacking 
transparency and consistency in its rulings.43 The prospect of the newly drafted Political 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 HOLM, U. 2013. Libya in transition: the fragile and insecure relation between the local, the national 
and the regional. In: ANDERSEN, L. R. (ed.) How the local matters. Democratization in Libya, Pakistan, 
Yemen and Palestine. Copenhagen: DIIS., p. 28. 
41 MCQUINN, B. 2012. Armed Groups in Libya: Typology and Roles. Research Notes. Armed Actors. 
Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.,. 2. 
42 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. 2013. Libya: Ensure ‘Political Isolation Law’ Respect Rights. Distinguish 
Vetting from Puring. Available from: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/22/libya-ensure-political-
isolation-law-respects-rights [Accessed 1 April 2013]. 
43 See Libya Herald, 5 November 2012. 
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Isolation Law is, therefore, encouraging, even though the impact of this remains to be seen. In 
conclusion, integration of the revolutionary brigades is a difficult but daunting task.  
The identity as guardians of the revolution does not seem to be important to the 
unregulated brigades. Indeed, it is thus more vital to consider their position in the local 
communities. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly what tasks the unregulated brigades 
perform, it is evident that their actions are highly dependent on the esteem of the local 
communities, as emphasized by McQuinn. Probably, what discourage the unregulated brigades 
mostly from disarming is the loss of prestige it would entail. Thus, it would pave the way for 
disarmament, if the unregulated brigades could be compensated for any feeling of degradation. 
This can only be achieved by considerable dialogue with the local communities, properly 
conducted by Libyan authorities without the support of foreign actors. In general, peripheral 
communities of Libya regard foreign actors with suspicion44.  
Thus, the potential of foreign assistance will be limited. Following the analysis made by 
George Joffé, referred by Barak Barfi and Jason Pack, even Libyan central authorities will have 
great difficulties initiating the disarmament. The process will not be successful unless initiated 
by local actors, he states.45 Considering the historical importance of the regions of Libya and 
maladies of Qadhafi’s central institutions, resentment to centralisation is understandable. 
Certainly, this conclusion could undermine hopes for an impending resolution of the security 
threat posed by the unregulated brigades. Yet, it should rather serve to remind foreign actors to 
tread carefully when engaging in power struggles of Libya.  
With regards to the post-revolutionary brigades, the conditions of the local communities 
are also essential to account for. Since the post-revolutionary brigades developed in response to 
the instability emerged after the retraction of Qadhafi’s forces, reestablishing security should be 
first priority. If the revolutionary brigades are successfully integrated in the National Army it 
will have the positive side effect of easing the process of gaining control over the post-
revolutionary brigades.  
Naturally, the identity of the post-revolutionary brigades is also vital to consider, when 
approaching them. Their self-images as fighters are probably not as consolidated as the self-
images of the revolutionary brigades and the unregulated brigades. According to Marlene 
Gottwald, a qualitative study shows that the majority of the armed non-state actors would prefer 
to return to civilian life rather than one in the military or police.46 This indicates that 
engagement in brigades is more frequently related to the lack of meaningful alternatives than the 
outcome of deliberate decision. Establishing credible prospects of civil employment would thus 
significantly increase the chances of dissolving the post-revolutionary brigades. However, this 
constitutes a rather insoluble dilemma. To generate jobs in Libya, foreign investments are 
highly needed. Yet, they are also likely to be scarce as long as the security situation remains 
fragile.  
Fortunately, the situation grants foreign actors other important tasks in addition to 
investing in Libya. As mentioned by Gottwald, one alternative for actors such as the EU is to 
provide vocational training for the young men currently engaged in the post-revolutionary 
                                                          
44 LACHER, W. 2011. Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution. Middle East Policy, 18, 140-
154., p. 150. 
45 BARFI, B. & PACK, J. 2012. In War’s Wake. The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya. Policy Focus. 
Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.,. 14. 
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brigades. Such offers of vocational training provide the young men with a meaningful 
alternative to violent activities. At the same time, it grants them competences to engage in civil 
life, preparing them for the jobs that hopefully will be generated in the future. However, 
according to Sharqieh, out of an estimated 200.000 members of armed groups, only 10.000 have 
signed up for the disarmament and reintegration programmes already initiated.47As for the 
group of armed non-state actors categorized as militias, it appears likely that progress within 
this area demands a strong and well-functioning National Army as well as further developed 
state institutions. Evidently, this process will take time. Until the process is completed, it seems 
that a “dual power” situation will remain in Libya. On one side, the relatively weak new 
leadership of the General National Congress and the Libyan Army represent the official Libya. 
On the other side, as emphasized by Sharqieh, “[T]he “uofficial state” led by the Supreme 
Security Council (…) and other military councils in the country, hold the real power.”48 
 
Conclusion 
The un(der)developed state of Qadhafi’s Libya was partly an effect of the rentier-state left by 
King Idriss, but also, as shown, a result of the ideological ambitions presented in Qadhafi’s 
Green Book. The lack of institutional development of “the stateless society” was as such 
intentional, and although the abundance of fossil fuels in the Libyan underground at least 
potentially might make a reconstruction of post-Qadhafi Libya possible in the sense that the 
economic means are available, huge challenges lie ahead for the new leadership. Institution 
building is not an easy task after forty-two years of disastrous leadership. 
It has been the idea of this article to discuss the recent situation in the new Libya, 
hereunder the possibilities for Libyan-European cooperation. In some areas Qadhafi, as 
mentioned, shared common interests with the EU, both in preventing radical groups from 
gaining foothold in North Africa and in controlling migratory movements from Africa south of 
Sahara into the Mediterranean security environment. The beginning normalization of Libya, 
following Qadhafi’s renunciation of WMDs in 2003, was also a signal to a rapprochement 
between Libya and the EU. A tool for this process was presented from the EU side with the 
publishing of the Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2011-2013, but 
with the revolt and internal war from early 2011 further cooperation was no longer meaningful, 
at least until the conflict was over. According to an EU Commission Memo Libya has 
announced that it will join the UfM as observer. Maybe the project based approach which 
characterizes the UfM might be relevant in the Libyan context, but first of all a renegotiation of 
the trade agreements will have to be taken care of. 
The lack of coherence between Libyas regions characterizing the country under Qadhafi 
was violently suppressed by the regime at the same time as the local elites and tribal leaders 
were bought off by nepotism and privileges. The new Libya is in principle based on democratic 
elections and the gradual establishment of modern institutions, but so far, as demonstrated, the 
new order is threatened by strong and diversified layers of armed groups, which even challenge 
the legitimacy of the National Army. As shown the weakness of the National Army is to some 
degree a result of Ghadafi’s “stateless society” in the sense that he deliberately kept the army 
weak and divided. Attempts at strengthening the national security system are taking place, but 
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so far the existence of an incoherent but strong network of local councils, brigades and militias 
creates a “dual power” situation in Libya, challenging the new regime and its security apparatus. 
This might be the most significant task to deal with, before a new order in Libya is a stable 
reality. 
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